Transfers: a deductive approach to gifts, gambles, and economy at large by Pickles, A. J.
Transfers














0011-This paper reinterprets core issues in economic anthropology by exploring transfers as a theoretical resource. After describing de-
liberate usage of the term “transfer” in anthropology and economics, transfers are defined as movements of economic matter, while
transactions are the forms arising from their configuration. Transactional categories such as Maussian gift exchange or market ex-
change become second-order reifications. Examining the politics of creating and sustaining transactional categories by first looking at
the elementary transfers out of which they are constructed places “one-way transfers” of wealth on the same conceptual plane as
reciprocal andmarket transactions, instead of being a derivative or a remainder of either or both. Gifts and gambling are considered as
examples. Gambling and “pure gifts” are one-way transfers engineered to possess only one component transfer, and Maussian gifts
explicitly connect transfers together in a particular politics. Anthropological literature that employs an incipient version of the transfer
strategy is detailed, demonstrating its nascent explanatory promise. The article concludes by suggesting renewed engagement with
contemporary economics on the basis of transfers.If anthropologists adopt a terminology based on transfers, they
can better forefront the specificity, temporality, inventiveness,
and disputed nature of dealing in transactional categories.1
“Transactions” here means each and every imaginable instance
during which congealed human activity is considered tomove.2
In this terminology an ecosystem of transactions envelops us
all, and it is made up of mitochondrial transfers. Each move-
ment of economic matter with a single directionality is a trans-
fer whether or not it is thought to be part of a more compli-
cated transaction.3
A focus on transfers works as an ideological leveler when
juxtaposing transactive forms that are privileged by anthro-
pology, such as pure gifts, Maussian gifts, and commodity ex-
changes, with those that are largely peripheral to anthropology
(but not so to other disciplines), such as gambling and social
security schemes. They all sit together at the midlevel, below
“transaction” and above transfer. Instead of being polemical
starting points for analysis as they are now, I argue transac-
tional subcategories like gifts and commodities should become
ethnographic particulars, that is, the results of the political work
that goes into defining the nature of transfers, both in the fieldony J. Pickles is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow in the Depa
ol Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RF, United Kingdom [ajp225@cam.ac.
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I use italics when I refer to the analytical category transfer. Eth-
phically reified transactions such as the “one-way transfer” appear
man.
I therefore use the term “transaction” in a far more general way than,
trathern and Stewart (2000) or transactionalist theory in general (see
1966:1–11).
Thus keeping fealty with the French and Latin source of the En-
word: transfér-er or transferre, meaning to bear, carry, or bring
s (OED 2018).
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aand in the seminar room. Focusing on transfers allows one
to analyze the problematics of transactional subcategories such
as gifts from the start of the description, rather than reaching
problematization as a conclusion, which is where existing lit-
erature usually ends. One reaches axioms of exchange by de-
scribing how ambiguities come to appear resolved (or fail to
do so) in practice. Not without irony, this theoretical article
therefore aims to facilitate more ethnographically led and re-
flective analyses.
Once I have made my case, I return to Maussian gifts, pure
gifts, gambling, etc. the megafauna populating our transac-
tional Anthropocene, seeing each as sustained by materiality,
politics, power, and enumerative processes all bundled together
through iteration and precedent. I will also infer how sys-
temic interpretation might apply to transfers as it does to gifts
and markets. When I zero in on Maussian gifts and gambling,
the former is imagined as an expression of struggles to anchor
economic transfers to reciprocal obligation, the latter cast as
a manifestation of efforts to decouple economic transfers from
reciprocal obligation.
Shifting emphasis away from existing anthropological cate-
gories of circulation and toward transfers is conceived as a lateral
move. Transfers are not a reality to be found; they are a concept
to be used, even if in some cases they are also a concept used by
one’s subjects. The transfer is emphatically not claimed as a
universally held principle in the same way as has been argued
for terms like “exchange,” “reciprocity,” or the “gift.”However,
as an analytical category the transfer can be used to delimit com-
ponents within all the transactions that might be employed to
propagate and enact what one takes to be either universal or
localized principles. Such forces as obligation, reciprocity, or
alienation remain in play; using transfers simply expands thertment of Social Anthropology of the University of Cambridge (Free
uk]). This paper was submitted 10 IV 17, accepted 26 VIII 18, and
-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved.
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12 Current Anthropology Volume 61, Number 1, February 2020domain of study while simplifying the terms of analysis in what
has become a bewildering set of debates. The scholarly ques-
tions posed by economic activity are then ever so slightly re-
structured, creating an opportunity to turn over old stones.4. What Gell (1992) called the “indigenous service economy” and
Sahlins (2004 [1965]) called “generalized reciprocity.”One-Way Transfers
Given the article’s scope, it is appropriate to begin with James
Carrier’s (2005) edited volume A Handbook of Economic An-
thropology, part 3 of which contains five chapters under the
heading “Circulation.” These are “Ceremonial Exchange,” “The
Gift and Gift Economy,” “Barter,” “The Anthropology of Mar-
kets,” and “One-Way Economic Transfers.” In his short intro-
duction Carrier points out that while circulation has been the
most fruitful and impactful area of economic anthropological
investigation, anthropological attention has fallen unevenly.
Particularly, “one-way economic transfers” receive almost no
consideration despite the fact that they “quietly” raise important
questions about the assumption that “circulation requires the
exchange of value” (Carrier 2005:229). I hope to raise the vol-
ume as I proceed, suggesting that the one-way-ness of one-way
transfers is already an important part of our analysis of mul-
tidirectional transactions. By recognizing as much and em-
bracing the implications, anthropologists might generate a
productive new dialogue about transactions broadly. Indeed,
the problem of whether circulation requires the exchange of
value should fall away if, as I suggest, transfers are equally
operative in both exchanges of value and one-way transfers.
In 1977, in a largely forgotten book called The Origins of the
Economy, Frederic Pryor turned to the term “one-way transfer”
as a means of categorizing his data on economic activity (Pryor
1977). Pryor needed to distinguish between transmissions of
wealth that were balanced by a material counterpart, which he
called “exchange” (and which included market or commodity
transactions), and ones which were not, called “one-way trans-
fers.” Pryor’s larger aim was to use statistical regressions to es-
tablish correlations between various aspects of diverse econo-
mies. His categorization (probably taken from economics) cut
through a proliferation of anthropological jargon obscuring
the cross-cultural hard data he had collated on the transmis-
sion of valuables (see table 1).
Robert Hunt (2000, 2002, 2005) took up Pryor’s exchanges/
one-way transfers distinction and championed adding the term
“transfer” to the economic anthropological lexicon. The two
dominant conceptual frameworks for circulation, Hunt argues,
are gift and market, both of which are kinds of exchange within
which one party and another compare the things they exchange.
Market exchange is of the greatest interest to economists, while
gift exchange has been most central to anthropology. Hunt
provides a handy definition of a third mode of circulation, trans-
fers. A transfer is “the shift of a valued (X) from one social
unit (A) to another social unit (B). The valued can be tangible,
a service, or knowledge. The shift can refer to changes in pos-
session, as well as to shifts in ownership. . . . The X beingThis content downloaded from 139.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms atransferred has economic content. It contains the efforts of
production (work, skill, and experience)” (Hunt 2002:108).
Hunt’s definition implies that transfers are the basic unit of
which all transactions are made, and exchange is a kind of
elaboration where another transfer replaces the original (see
also Hunt 2000). Pryor (1977:30) had similarly concluded that
generalized exchange (i.e., intercommunity sharing, demand
sharing)4 is actually a series of transfers because these trans-
actions never reach a formal balance. But Hunt’s observation
passes by almost unexplored and instead those transfers that
have no counterpart are juxtaposed to exchanges as categories
of transaction belonging on the same scale: gift, market, and
transfer (Hunt 2002). I surmise that for Hunt transactional
types are essentially ethnographic empirical units, and there-
fore transfers cease to be transfers once they are recognized
empirically as exchanges (e.g., Hunt 2000:19–21). It is only by
operating at the scale of empirical phenomena that one-way
transfers could be said to pose questions about the exchange
of value found in other, equally empirically observable kinds
of transaction because only as a reified transaction type can
transfers be said to have no return counterpart and thus no
clear basis for an exchange of value.
By the time the Handbook of Economic Anthropology comes
out, Hunt (2005) seems to have retreated from the implication
that the transfer is of a different order to exchange and repre-
sents what he calls “one-way transfers” as simply an under-
explored subfield (which it undoubtedly is). In fact it is the re-
treat that presents the bigger problems, because a subcategory
of one-way transfers looks positively dysmorphic, lumping to-
gether what would otherwise be considered radically differ-
ent transactions. In the Handbook these include household
pooling, forager food-sharing, inheritance, endowments, theft,Table 1. Pryor’s exemplars of one-way transfers, together
with the rationale givenOne-way
transfer2.123.226 on May 
nd Conditions (httpRationaleHousehold
poolingParents transfer to all their children, but care for
aging parents is generally restricted to a subset of a
parent’s children.Forager food-
sharingAllocation is not commensurate with status or par-
ticipation in acquisitive activity.Inheritance The inheritance is generally not on the basis of prior
economic interaction.Endowments Donors are not supposed to retain any control over
the assets.Theft Thieves take from victims for their gain.
Hospitality The host cares for the guest whether or not they will
meet again.
Gambling The winner takes wealth from a loser without binding
obligation.11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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5. There are papers confirming that transfer pricing responds to tax
rates (Clausing 2003), determining which jurisdictions transfer pricing op-
erates across (Bartelsman and Beetsma 2003), and discussing the technical
problem of independent company “profit centers” in different jurisdictions,
each aiming to increase its own profit, potentially at the expense of the
company as a whole (Hirshleifer 1956).
Pickles Transfers 13charity, pensions, slavery, and gambling. We should not expect
any formal elegance in human activities, but when theft and
charity are in one subcategory that is then opposed as a whole
to gift exchange, then the situation is clearly obstructive. One-
way transfers are an anthropological residual, a collection of
bones found in the same cave, and so, faced with an already
creaking transaction vocabulary, I want to use Hunt’s original
insight to instead clear some brush.
Such as they exist empirically, one-way transfers represent
both a vast amount of value and a huge proportion of wealth
movements. In 2014 the market value of the endowment
funds of colleges and universities in the United States was
US$535 billion (NCES 2016:744). The total value of stolen
goods in the United Kingdom was £1.8 billion in 2013–2014,
down from £6.9 billion in 1995 (Shaw et al. 2015). Inheritance
currently stands at 11% of French national income (Piketty
2014:380). These are large numbers, but they are trifling com-
pared to the slavery upon which the United States’ economic
development was built (Fogel and Engerman 1974).
Now contemplate the proportion of all transactions in
immediate-return hunter-gatherer societies that are one-way
transfers (Hunt 2000; Woodburn 1998). Consider also aggre-
gating all the household pooling that occurs in single-income
households in (post)industrialized economies. Pryor (1977) was
able to estimate that in 1970 intrafamily transfers accounted for
a startling 39% of national income in the United States. While
these one-way transfers may look deviant or at least unusual in
either anthropological or, indeed, economic theories that high-
light bi- or multilateral exchanges, they clearly are not empiri-
cally uncommon or tricky for the lay person to grasp. In fact,
boiled down to its bare bones the physical law of entropymakes
a system of one-way transfers the essential condition for all
reproductive life since it must replace itself. One-way transfers
are simply theoretically undervalued because they appear re-
sidual the way they currently stand in the literature (but see
Schokkaert 2006; Ythier 2006).
While these activities have very different effects and politics,
they are united both because nothing moves in the other di-
rection to an initial transfer of wealth and there is no definitive
obligation saying there should be. Reasons for lack of obligation
to return range broadly, from the death of the donor, to the
recipient’s impending demise, to the fact that the wealth was
won or stolen—or, as in slavery, the recipient took ownership
of the donor and all that they produce. It is in terms of lack that
these transactions are thought through by scholars. With the
theoretical vantage of exchange as their starting point, anthro-
pologists typically treat charity, for instance, as attempts to
systematically override recipients’ obligation to return. Thus in
the language of exchange, charity is a chastened gift or a com-
modity denied a market (Laidlaw 2000; M. Strathern 2012).
In this way an exchange-centered anthropology has somehow
managed to render one-way transfers simultaneously paro-
chial to the everyday practice of anthropology and to turn
them into curious puzzles to be elaborately deciphered from
within the exchange paradigm.This content downloaded from 139.22
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Economists meanwhile have been using transfers as a con-
cept for decades (if not developing it theoretically), with most
textbooks tracing transfers back at least as far as a debate be-
tween John Maynard Keynes and Bertil Ohlin in 1929. Brak-
man and Van Marrewijk (1998) inform us that all economic
exchanges involve transfers, most of which are purchases and
therefore “bilateral transfers,” but they go on to focus, as all
economic research on transfers seems to do, on “unilateral
transfers,”what RobertHunt called “one-way transfers,” that is,
a movement of wealth not matched by a return. It must be
noted that economists need not and often have not applied the
same rules as have anthropologists in determining whether
a transfer is “unilateral.” For economists it can be enough that
an exchange of transfers is uneven; it need not be entirely
unidirectional—a tendency probably related to their primary
interest in market transactions. It would be fair to say that
economists have discovered a great deal about the metrics of
transfers, particularly their relationships to other transactions,
but questions about the philosophical nature of those transfers
have been deferred. For economists transfers are found im-
balances in the flow of value.
In international trade and relations aid, debt forgiveness,
investment grants, damages payments, and remittances are
characterized as “international transfers.”Within states the term
“transfer payments” is applied most often to welfare programs,
which transfer wealth or wealth-in-kind from those able to
pay for it to those in need (called “public transfers”), and by
extension to movements of wealth that occur within families
(“private transfers”). Economists also use “transfer pricing” to
denote the price strategies that firms use when they sell valu-
ables between operations in one jurisdiction and operations
in another. Companies manipulate these transfer prices, sell-
ing their own wares to another subsidiary based in a higher tax
regime at high prices, thereby moving their profits to the lower
tax jurisdiction. The deliberate result is an imbalanced flow of
wealth from one jurisdiction to another.5
Economic analysis of intrafamilial “private transfers” cen-
ters on the measurability of nonmarket movements of wealth,
with a focus on the effectiveness of these activities in foster-
ing generalized financial well-being. Papers investigate the
relationship between “public-transfer” programs (welfare pro-
grams) and intrafamily-level “private-transfers” (Cox and Ja-
kubson 1995; Jensen 2004), others investigate the relation-
ship between “private transfers” and income (Cox,Hansen, and
Jimenez 2004), and yet others compare intrafamily transfers2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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ents’ deaths (McGarry 1999). “Conditional cash transfers,”
meanwhile, link state interests in “good citizenship” to eco-
nomic transfers. These are welfare programs requiring a re-
cipient to make prespecified investments (usually in their
children). As policy tools these have mushroomed in impor-
tance since the mid-1990s (Ferreira et al. 2009:4). Two of the
earliest iterations of conditional cash transfers, Brazil’s Bolsa
Família and Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly PROGRESA),
are now the largest social assistance programs in their respec-
tive countries, covering millions of households and families
(Eger and Damo 2014). Anthropologically, conditional cash
transfers can be seen as governmental attempts to exert control
over the effects of, among other things, intrafamily transfers that
thwart government’s stated aims. In general terms, economists
explore quantitatively the complicated and often conflicting hu-
man experiences of determining the “one-way-ness” or not of
these transfers, potentially complementing qualitative anthropo-
logical accounts of welfare (e.g., Edgar andRussell 1998; Gudeman
and Rivera 1990; Morgen and Maskovsky 2003).
Economists have encountered definitional issues around
such matters as whether pensions are transfers, which depends
on whether they are linked conceptually to the payments one
makes before retirement or to the income the fund generates
and pays out after retirement (Moon 1984). Anthropology is
critically equipped to address such questions, but to do so, I
would argue, requires a reevaluation of the bilateral or multi-
lateral exchange-based paradigm we share with economics.
What both disciplines have right now are categories derived
from ideal types that leave “one-way” or “unilateral” transfers as
the residue of other forms of exchange and that are therefore
characterized in terms of what they “lack.”
Having outlined the problematic, I now try releasing the idea
of a transfer from the inductive “one-way transfer” group of
empirical phenomena and apply transfers deductively as a
micro-concept to all transactions as a kind of tool kit for the-
oretical bricolage. Instead of being an empirical outlier to more
normal multilateral exchanges, the transfer then becomes a the-
oretical motive (in the sense of movement) force that scaffolds
all the world’s emergent transactions.
Transfers
Instead of creating ideal typical subcategories of transaction
I envisage skipping down to transfers, which are modeled as
operating at an infra-transactional level.6 The analytical term
transfer denotes one isolated unidirectional component within
a concrete transaction, that is, something passing from me to
you or you to me;7 the component may or may not be recip-6. Davis (1992:29), e.g., makes a partial repertoire of British exchanges,
listing 42 possible kinds of exchange. The jargon situation has not im-
proved since then (Hann 2006).
7. The component should be locally defined. For example, if, when
contributing to a mortuary payment, a portion of sweet potato must al-
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transaction. If a “transfer” gets balanced with a return, it becomes
an “exchange” of two (or more) transfers (e.g., barter, purchase,
or like-for-like exchange). If the return happens later, this
would be a “delayed exchange” of two transfers (i.e., tit for tat).
A “transfer” that is not accompanied by a return and has no
prospect of generating one in the future is a “one-way trans-
fer.” Such a “one-way transfer” is of course no less and no
more a cultural artifact than an “exchange of transfers,” but a
“one-way transfer” and an “exchange of transfers” can be an-
alytically distinguished because the former contains only one
component “transfer,” while the latter has two or more.
The valuables in motion during a “one-way transfer” do not
have a counter-valuable against which their value can be di-
rectly compared, whereas an “exchange of transfers” offers an
opportunity for direct comparison.8 There is therefore a qual-
itative difference between one-way transfers and two-way trans-
fers or exchanges. A delayed exchange conceptually bridges the
two until it is completed or the return is no longer possible.
To mark the difference I use italics when I refer to the analyt-
ical category transfer. Ethnographically reified transactions
such as the “one-way transfer” appear in roman.
The form of transfers that are included within each “trans-
action” will often be murky, for three reasons elaborated be-
low. (1) The transfer may not be deemed delineable or enu-
merable (e.g., suckling an infant). (2) Linking one transfer to
another and calling it a certain kind of transaction is as much
about political recognition as it is about the items themselves.
(In gambling, e.g., the winner is not obliged to compensate a
loser, but that does not stop people from demanding that they
do just that.) (3) Intangibles such as respect, status, and/or
obligation that may accrue in return for a transfer are only as
concrete as their effects and may be retrospectively enhanced
or denuded by subsequent events, changing the balance of
the transfers within a transaction if they are traced back to it.
Starting at this lower, infra-conceptual level is a way to cir-
cumvent the a priori assumption within the term “exchange”
that a return is expected, a point I discuss later. This is not
to say that exchange and reciprocity are irrelevant, only that
they require establishment and maintenance. By coupling the
heuristic term “transaction” with the microlevel transfer, one
might incorporate that murkiness and avoid employing the
false clarity of prescriptive subcategories.
1. Instead of a moment of exchange, which sits somewhere
in the convergence of perspectives that may never have actually
converged (e.g., Strathern and Stewart 2000:17–18), let the
particle of circulation be the transfer of congealed human ac-
tivity from the control of one entity to another. Any given
transaction can then accommodate multiple perspectives from
each angle. The point of convergence at which a transfer takes8. The value of the valuable involved in a one-way transfer can of
course still be compared to other valuables in the abstract.
ways accompany a pig, then pig 1 sweet potato may be considered a sin-
gle transfer.
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Pickles Transfers 15place is then an arena for both competing valuations of the
thing or service being transferred but also, and as part of the
determination of value, the competing values of various eco-
nomic philosophies and/or pragmatics.
Encompassing exchanges within the scientific jargon of
transfers does not place every kind of transfer on a single
measurable scale. It is surely impossible to live without making
categories for comparison and creating value comparisons, but
the generality of the means of measurement are themselves
highly variable and of differing degrees of abstraction within
natural languages (Gudeman 2001:14). The term transfer is
designed, rather, to free up discussion of the commensurative
possibilities, constraints, and perspectives that occur around a
transfer or grouping of transfers. Knowing the nature of the
transferred item as a unit is also not necessary prior to the
transfer or a necessary consequence of it. Transfers are possi-
ble not because the things that move are immutable objects
but because the properties of things in the social world are given
immutability that appears objective (Verran 2001). Indeed, the
establishment, perpetuation, or erasure of the transferred ob-
ject’s status as a unit may well be an important feature in iden-
tifying its politics and the social reality generating it (Pickles
2013; M. Strathern 1992). The accretion of immutability through
continued circulation provides parameters within which each
party establishes their own valuations as a function of their
separation as parties to a transaction.
2. The mutual recognition of the coupling of transfers does
not presuppose that each party is an autonomous agent acting in
the rational pursuit of material self-interest (or any other form
of self-maximization); the goal is to instead foreground the
political constitution of distinction and mutuality through the
work of delineating in each case what counts as a transferable
object, what are the appropriate ways that it might move, and
how might that movement be innovated upon to the benefit of
those it is being used to delineate.
The transfer is not to be equated with disinterested giving
(contra Sneath 2006, 2012) except under conditions where
that motivation can be clearly delineated (e.g., in Davis 1992).
A given actor may choose to assess their transactions in in-
strumental terms, or for that matter, through any other politi-
cal philosophy. The project of understanding transactions in
terms of transfers thereby necessitates localized ethnographic
knowledge of how transactions are perceived. A transfer can
create chains that are characterized by one party as involving
some transfers and not others, while the other party may in-
clude and exclude completely different past and future transfers
and partners.
3. There are various ways in which a transfer is proscribed or
limited by the nature of the wealth under consideration, espe-
cially in the case of permanent sources of production such as
land, which, for example, may be allotted by a matriline, may
have usufruct rights given, ormay be leased by legal contract. In
the case of valuables such as cash money or a harvest, which are
locally unanchored and therefore have the capacity to flow out
of immediate communities, transfers may be more often ac-This content downloaded from 139.22
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items that might conceivably be transferred but that are too
important to do so in practice are often considered priceless or
ungiftable (what Annette Weiner called “inalienable wealth”
[Weiner 1992]), negating their transfer-ability to outsiders and
defining the boundary of insider and outsider. These heirlooms
are transferred intergenerationally, proffering continuity on the
political entity asserting to have kept them. Retention precip-
itates a form of valuation that evades enumeration and com-
mensuration but may also be the subject of strategic action, as
when a frequent traveler holds onto a few euros just in case.
Bringing transferable objects into association with inalienable
wealth is another strategic action that augments their value, for
instance a letterhead that carries a crest. Side-stepping atem-
poral economic abstractions like gifts or inheritance allows a
view of historical processes by which valuables are recon-
textualized and revalued through the action of outgoing trans-
fers or equally active efforts at retentive transfers.
I outline these limits because a shift in lexicon is no elixir,
and I am certainly no Pollyanna. The shadow cast by shifting
focus onto transactions as composed of transfers both enables
and necessitates switching perspectives again so as to illumi-
nate the contours of both a theory and its shadow (see Jiménez
and Willerslev 2007). Transfer is useful as a reflective prompt
because it carries far less conceptual content than anthropo-
logical terms such as “gift exchange,” “commodity exchange,”
“barter,” or “hospitality,” let alone “exchange” itself. It is both
more general, and more basic, enabling one to include a far
broader array of transactions when filling in the content with-
out the problem of certain forms slipping through the cracks.
To demonstrate this potential I now discuss two transactions
with distinct but complementary transfer dynamics: first gift-
ing and then gambling. The coupling of the transfers involved
in each case is politically charged in a manner that invites their
productive juxtaposition.Pure Gifts, Maussian Gifts,
Unaccompanied Transfers
Anthropological orthodoxy distinguishes “pure gifts” from
“Maussian gifts.” A pure gift is altruistic, an act of generosity
without concern for a return, that is, a one-way transfer. A
Maussian gift appears the same: it too is an item conferred by
a donor upon a recipient under the auspice that a return is
voluntary. However, in a Maussian gift this auspice is deemed
to be to various degrees delusory. Parties know that a return is
obligatory and that the other party knows that they know it is
obligatory (Mauss 1990). Everyone participates in a contrived
game of free will, and early debate centered on whether self-
interest was all that was behind it (Malinowski’s [1926:27]
position) or whether generosity played an operative role for the
individual; the interest in reciprocity came from the moral
person as defined by the social unit (Mauss’s position; see
Parry 1986:455–456). The timing of a return on a Maussian2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
16 Current Anthropology Volume 61, Number 1, February 2020gift is potentially open-ended, but in every case there is an
expectation among at least one party to the transaction that a
return transfer will eventually take effect. This may end the
exchange or instigate yet other transfers in an ongoing web
known as an exchange system. Godelier (1999:10) points out
that it was Mauss’s genius to reconnect the point of depar-
ture of original gifts to the point of arrival of their returns. I
contend that this reconnection during analysis and its nega-
tion (seen in the pure gift) is always essentially an ideological
project. Lack of reciprocation is basically excluded from con-
sideration by Mauss by virtue of Mauss’s interest in gifts inso-
far as they were precursors to contractual law, in the Durk-
heimian evolutionary tradition (Parry 1986:457).
Pure gifts are also complicated transfers in their own ways:
categorically destroying all feelings of obligation may be con-
sidered undesirable or even impossible (Laidlaw 2000); pure
gifts may have a depurifying effect on the gift itself (Parry 1986);
or last, because it appears impossible to get rid of the niggling
faculty that humans have for conjuring immaterial counter-
weights (Bourdieu 1977). These complications are important,
but all can potentially agree that a pure gift, if it does exist, must
necessarily be a one-way transfer.
Posing Maussian gift exchange as the structural opposite of
capitalism is a strawman regularly unmasked in lecture theaters
and seminar rooms. To achieve this unveiling, most oversim-
plify ChristopherGregory’s (1982)Gifts and Commodities to say
that in gift economies (as opposed to capitalist economies) the
important result is always and only the relationship that the
contributions represent or bring into being, rather than the gift
itself that participants really desire. Meanwhile, in capitalist
economies things characteristically take the form of commod-
ities divorced from their producers, and because that is how
their subjects are accustomed to thinking of objects, people
tend to desire the thing that is given and not the abstract labor
relationships that created it. From that polemical starting point
it is a short step to revealing that societies that organize their
economy through delayed reciprocity (famous examples being
the Kula Ring in Papua New Guinea and potlatch in the Pacific
Northwest) intensely desire the things themselves for themselves
after all. Ipso facto one can then reveal that the relationship
represented by a gift in a commodity economy is often, in fact,
far more important than the object. It is by now well established
that the gift can be seen in the market transaction and object
fetishism in the gift (e.g., Appadurai 1986; Carrier 1990; Gell
1992). The romantic association between altruistic giving and
simple economies who practice gift exchange is then revealed
as a commodity-induced projection, because the very possibil-
ity of separation of interest from gift is shown to be an artifact
that is, if not peculiar to a capitalist economy, then at least
correlated with it (Carrier 1990). The current consensus on the
importance of Maussian gifts versus pure gifts follows Parry’s
common sense wisdom, that empirically “it is not a question
of either an ideology of reciprocity or of its repudiation, but
rather of a significant difference in the extent to which these
possibilities are elaborated” (Parry 1986:466).This content downloaded from 139.22
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the gift itself (pure or Maussian) contains a spirituality that is
either socially generative or polluting, and in turn whether that
spirit emanates from the donor or some more mystical source.
These occur most notably in debates surrounding the proper-
ties of the Maori hau or the Hindu dan/dana (e.g., Firth 2011
[1929]; Graeber 2001; Laidlaw 2000; Lévi-Strauss 1973; Parry
1986; Sahlins 1972). Whether or not the gift is literally or fig-
uratively part of the person of the giver does not concern me
here. I here bracket the “spirit of the gift” so as to draw attention
to a more prosaic point about how transfers either become one-
way transfers known as pure gifts or get coupled up to become
Maussian gifts.
In this article a Maussian gift occurs when an attempt to
couple the outgoing transfer of economic matter to a transfer
that is perceived as a return is socially recognized. A pure gift
occurs where a return transfer is deemed unnecessary or inap-
propriate by all parties or by the presiding authority. The focus
instantly shifts to the political constitution of forms of trans-
action out of their component transfers. It also immediately
strikes one that, framed in this way, a pure gift requires a strong
consensus or authority if it is to be accepted as pure and not
Maussian. This is because any credible suspicion that the pure
transfer might in fact be Maussian rather poisons the well for
everyone. The unaccompanied transfer is always at risk be-
cause the mind works through connection; it therefore makes
sense that unaccompanied transfers would bemore common in
authoritarian societies, where conceptual connections between
transfers can be effectively sanctioned.
I take a particular interest in Maussian gifts because they are
conceptually more common than their altruistic counterparts,
and because where I conduct research in Papua New Guinea
reciprocal gifting and ceremonial exchanges are extremely con-
spicuous. The first explorers, colonial officers, missionaries, and
anthropologists in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea found
some of its peoples had developed what looks likeMaussian gift
exchange into their most exulted cultural forms, a to-and-fro
that played out over and beyond the life cycle of its individual
members and involved the most valued items: usually pigs,
shells, dog’s teeth, feathers, and axes. Thousands of pigs and
shells moved through vast networks for the bragging rights
of political leaders whose fame and authority were manifested
in large part through their transactive prowess. The colonizers
fed this grand competition (and ultimately undermined it) by
paying those who assisted them with shells, steel, and later,
money (Strathern and Stewart 2000).
Consequently,Melanesian anthropology has its own flavor of
ambivalence toward the Maussian gift. It is a paradigm-setting
concept ever associated with Melanesia through Mauss’s use
of Malinowski’s Trobriand material and because Melanesia fig-
ured prominently as ethnographic exemplar in the anthropo-
logical discourse that followed the translation of Mauss’s Essai
sur le don into English (e.g., Foster 1995; Gregory 1982; Munn
1986; A. Strathern 1971; M. Strathern 1988; Thomas 1991;
Weiner 1992). And yet, as James Carrier (1992) has argued, the2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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Pickles Transfers 17gift was far less prevalent in Melanesia than it appeared, the
commodity transaction far more common, and the ambiguities
of real economic life were too often hidden by an essentializing
character inMelanesian anthropology (see also Gell 1992). The
application of Maussian gift-logic undoubtedly cloaks a great
deal of Melanesian economic activity (but see Hart 1986;
Healey 1990; Rappaport 1984), but negative or complicating
argumentation such as Carrier’s is hard to rally behind and
tends to reproduce itself. No wonder it has become common in
the exchange literature to attach the prefix “so-called” before
using the term, so “exchange societies” becomes “so-called ex-
change societies” (e.g., Keane 2001), and in Melanesia in par-
ticular “gift exchange” became “so-called gift exchange” (e.g.,
Feil 1987; Gregory 1980; M. Strathern 1991).
Diacritics such as these are a good sign that the current terms
are creaking under the weight of their annotations. In the ab-
sence of alternatives and through the canonizing effect of con-
tinual diacritical exegeses, the Maussian gift developed into
Melanesia’s dominant conceptual device. It became Melane-
sian anthropological orthodoxy to interrogate the idea that the
gift, either competitive gifting or communistic sharing, but al-
ways binding, reciprocal, and total, was at one point the orga-
nizing principle for Melanesian sociality, and that the situation
has since been muddied by European encroachment (Akin and
Robbins 1999). In so doing, and in spite of many authors’ ef-
forts, the gift-commodity paradigm has been reinforced even
while it was tempered.
Anthropologists of Melanesia share with their interlocutors
an overriding concern with setting the boundaries of trans-
actions, implicating people in transactions with appeals to de-
finitive obligations but in the knowledge that their appeals were
transparently contingent (Pickles 2013, 2017). LikeMelanesianists
David Akin and Joel Robbins (1999), I found that my interloc-
utors “regularly work to differentiate kinds of exchanges, kinds
of relationships, and kinds of objects” (9) and are anxious about
the collapse of these distinctions (see alsoM. Strathern 1992). It
therefore seemed apt to shift the lens toward the prospecting
work of achieving the desired transactive forms (Pickles 2017;
cf. Munn 1986). In a context that foregrounds reciprocal giving
as an ideal, this meant concentrating on the human work of
connecting or disconnecting all those endless transfers.
Furthermore, I am always affected on fieldwork by the sense
of continual disappointment with the many failures usually
involved in conscious attempts to make lasting connections
through things. In present-day PapuaNewGuinea in particular,
a peripheral nation in the grip of bad-faith politicians and ex-
tractive industries and struggling with runaway inequalities, it is
at least as important to theorize failure to successfully make ex-
changes stick as it once was to understand them working effec-
tively. Analyzing exchanges as successfully connected transfers
has the knock-on effect of placing unsuccessfully connected
transfers on an equal analytical footing with those that succeed.
This is probably the area in which the term transfer has the most
potential. In Papua New Guinea, at least, failure to agree on the
formof a transaction and its proper deploymentmakes up a veryThis content downloaded from 139.22
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and while this may have been exacerbated since colonial inter-
vention, it must always have been more important than it has
appeared in exchange literature by default of the “exchange” unit
of analysis (but see Munn 1986).
While Papua New Guineans brought me to this conclusion,
I am increasingly convinced that regardless of site, reciprocal
gift exchange as “observed” has always depended on a leap of
faith on the part of the observer. Anthropologists are too ready
to follow some of their interlocutors’ statements, prioritizing the
ones that formulate “exchange” as balanced in a formal, ab-
stracted sense (Bourdieu 1977:4–9; A. Strathern 1971:101, 104;
Strathern and Stewart 2000:22–23). In some specific circum-
stances people do exchange one thing for an equivalent object at
the same time. But delayed exchanges form the bulk of the
exchange literature, and these depend on extrapolation from
either the idea of exchange of identical items or commodity
exchange (but see Foster 1990). The time and space between the
transfers in a delayed exchange invites explication, and this has
forefronted reciprocity, mutuality, and obligation as connect-
ing forces. But there exists also a great deal of contingency,
threat, and existential uncertainty. Anthropologists missed a
trick when we made a rule of assuming that gifts are usually
returned, then marking out occasions when a return is unwel-
come, rather than factoring in that they often are not (but see
Bourdieu 1977). It is not a sufficient question to ask, as Godelier
(1999) has asked, “Which principle prevails in the society and
why?” (14, emphasis in original). The question must instead
be how a practice is instituted into a prevailing principle within
and across social boundaries, and why. Not beginning from
the gift concept, one is far less likely to overextend it. Starting
at a smaller scale with less conceptual content and building
up toward transaction types might get us closer to people’s at-
tempts to muddle through their economic lives.
The argument thus far somewhat resembles Pierre Bourdieu’s
Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), within which Lévi-
Strauss’s treatment of the Maussian gift is eviscerated. Lévi-
Strauss is charged with objectifying reciprocity by foreground-
ing rules of exchange. Bourdieu castigates Lévi-Strauss, claiming
he effectively reified with rules a profoundly temporal and thus
uncertain practice into a certainty, and in so doing overlaid
upon the world the conditions of his own being as a socially
separated, intellectually elevated rule deriver. For Bourdieu the
“full truth of the gift” is the coexistence of two opposing truths,
the objective model of gift exchange as a total system, and the
subjective contingency by which the system is experienced and
reproduced. It is the temporality of gift exchange that enables
these two truths to coexist, and it is the responsibility of an-
thropology to articulate the full package—model, contingent
experience, and temporality—as a dynamic. Where Bourdieu
highlights temporality and its embodiment in practice as pro-
ductive of social institutions, I use transfers to codify the mul-
titude of available units that are the traffic of that temporality
and the object of directed objectification by both analyst and
practitioner. It is hoped that transfers can be used as part of2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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stand up to Bourdieu’s high standards. The aim is to enable
anthropologists to start whereabouts Bourdieu’s critique of ex-
change left off, not to repeat it.
Maurer similarly argued that contemporary economic an-
thropology is at its best when it shifts “the optic from exchange
to flow or circulation . . . [returning] the objects of exchange to
‘the space and time of their genesis’ (Eiss 2002:293; Gilbert 2005;
Keane 2001), revealing relationships missed by the reification
of subjects and objects that is sometimes presumed by the an-
alytical category of exchange” (Maurer 2006:21; see also Munn
1986). And yet Hann (2006:215, 221) argues that the term
transfer represents an abandonment of the broadly effective
Maussian paradigm dominating economic anthropology, a par-
adigm that has done much to underscore obligation as the ir-
reducible element within exchange. There is in fact no mutual
exclusivity between transfers and the Maussian paradigm, and
I will show that transfer is already an unacknowledged tech-
nique in economic anthropology within and without the Maus-
sian paradigm. As an analytical Lego brick within exchanges,
transfers in no sense displace existential social forces such as
reciprocity or self-maximization; instead they aid anthropo-
logical description of their constitution. I now demonstrate the
utility of transfers in folding one of the transactions sidelined
by the Maussian tradition into our discourse, gambling.Gambling
As a subcategory of transaction, gambling inevitably has fuzzy
borders open to ideological expansion or contraction (Pickles
2016, 2017). The Oxford English Dictionary (2017) defines
“gamble” as (1) “Play games of chance for money; bet.” and
(2) “Take risky action in the hope of a desired result.” The def-
inition is complicated when one considers either whether finan-
cial speculation has to be gambling by definitional necessity or
whether betting on games of skill or athleticism as opposed to
chance is gambling. Still, few would go so far as to claim that
gambling did not exist as a transactional type. For most gam-
bling is both distinctive and deeply ingrained, andmany assume
it to be a universal feature of all societies, though in fact it is not
(Pickles 2014b). Anglo-Saxons are among those who habitually
project gambling onto other activities, often claiming that this
or that activity is gambling if you think about it. Much of this
has to do with popular understandings of risk, probability, and
evolutionary theory (Reith 1999; Schüll 2012). The gambling
that “lies underneath” other activities is therefore not prima
facie explanatory but, rather, an ethnographic indicator of a
particular cosmological frame that considers gambling so rele-
vant that it gets projected outward. Where gambling’s history is
short, and where one cannot assume that the same associations
with risk, probability, and evolutionary theory have been in-
stilled, then the contours of gambling can be quite different
(Pickles 2014a). Facing this diversity up close, I have often asked
myself, What is unique to gambling that we all seem to recog-This content downloaded from 139.22
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of transaction, and how variable might that position be? Why,
exactly, is it close to financial speculation, and why is it far from
a Christmas present?
Seen from Pryor’s (1977:255) perspective, gambling is a kind
of one-way transfer: the winner is not obliged to make a return
to the loser(s). From another perspective (one promoted by
the gambling industry), a player spends money in order to gain
the pleasure of game play, making for a market exchange of
transfers. This perspective has been found to facilitate the le-
gitimization of gambling as one among many entertainment
products. The larger game surrounds sometimes lend them-
selves to still another perspective, one in which losers are indi-
rectly compensated bywinners with peripheral items or chances
to play again, resulting in an imbalanced exchange of trans-
fers. The link between transfers surrounding gambling (or lack
thereof) are an arena for politics that has considerable effect
on not only the moral status of the activity but also the value
created, exchanged, or destroyed by it.
From the perspective of most players, there is no doubt that
during play the definingmechanic is betting, which translates as
the opportunity for players to elicit a one-way transfer toward
themselves. By staking money (i.e., by committing it to being
part of a consolidated transfer) gamblers attempt to gain valu-
ables that have been divorced from reciprocal obligation, and
so cause a one-way transfer in their own direction. (A winner
regains his stake, and therefore can be said not to have made an
outgoing transfer.) Leaving aside the “gambling as exchange”
perspective so beloved by industry and some anthropologists,
and concentrating on most players’ perspective of gambling as
one-way transfer brings to light some interesting effects that
gambling has on the value of stakes. In betting, the values of
the stakes are compared as they are consolidated, as opposed
to what happens in a contemporaneous exchange of transfers,
when the value of the wealth is compared as the things are
exchanged. It is valuation by association rather than valuation
by friction. Valuation is underdetermined compared to an ex-
change of transfers because winning allows the victor to take
home both the value of their stake as well as some (or all) of the
other valuables staked by others. Gambling therefore privileges
subjective assessments of the value of one’s stake as opposed to
the market value of that stake. Subjective valuation is height-
ened by the repeated rounds of play, in which participants
may choose to anchor their success against high points, low
points, or the starting point of their bank, and money is moved
without it being made to correspond to another object or ser-
vice. Gambling shares this property with other one-way forms
of transfer (grants, charity, household pooling, and theft) and,
to a lesser extent, to acts of delayed reciprocity.
By contrast to Maussian gifting, gambling enforces certain
rules that purport to make it stand out from everyday rounds
of give and take as a one-sided transaction rather than a gift
bound up with obligations of return. In gambling the stake is
tied to the unforeseeable result of an event that, when resolved,
strictly determines an outcome. Gambling therefore has among2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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among players that one should be obliged to reciprocate the
flow of valuables that occurs during the course of a game. If
one were obliged to give a loser an amount equivalent to what
one won, this would not be gambling. Compensation must
be voluntary. Gambling must therefore be seen as a one-way
transfer. If reciprocity is felt necessary, it usually comes in the
form of a free game, a token return, or the axiom that a win-
ner must keep playing until a loser gives up. Gambling is in
this respect a vehicle for increasing not just your wealth but
also choice about whether to donate and to whom to do-
nate, as well as increasing the number of one-way transfers in
that context.
To generate the excitement of play, gambling must be ex-
perienced as a one-way transfer. In gambling, the carrot of
a one-way transfer induces transfers to be consolidated and
then redistributed. It is only by reifying the excitement (which
must be done at a remove from play itself) that it can appear
on another level as an exchange of transfers (excitement for
money). Part of that excitement is often generated by repeat
play, when the one-way transfers are themselves linked to-
gether in a run that is the subject of both lay and expert re-
flection. People ponder the connection of paradigmatically un-
connected transactions.
Gambling is a particularly underdetermined one-way trans-
fer, offering the potential for exploration of both possibility and
an interrogation of the valuables that are transferred. Appar-
ently divorced from obligation, the participants are free to
make their own plays and initiate their own flows of reciprocity
with their winnings and losses. It therefore sits at the nexus of
transactional possibilities, modeling an initiatory gift, the play
of reciprocity over time, and the exchange of wealth for enter-
tainment. In staking their subjective assessments of value, gam-
blers explore and potentially master the flow of transfers that
are the building blocks of economic life in what equates to a
“tournament of value” (Appadurai 1986).
The language of transfers opens up the conceptual possibil-
ities of gambling. By reifying the enjoyment of play and/or
heightening distribution choices, gambling highlights the con-
tingency involved in connecting up transfers. One can also
compare the transfer dynamics of Maussian gifts and gambling.
WhereMaussian gifts involve transfers that are spread over time
so that they risk becoming one-way transfers and are ultimately
satisfying when resolved, gambling intensifies transfers over a
short time while playing up their one-way status and generating
the expectation that the next win is just around the corner.
Gambling thereby instigates speculation on the nature of links
between discrete transactions. Gambling and Maussian gifting
are therefore a kind of transfer chiasmatic image of each other.
If the potential utility of using transfers analytically consists of
stripping back any transaction’s politics in order to describe that
politics as process, it will bolster my argument if I can dem-
onstrate that, in fact, anthropologists have been using the En-
glish vernacular word “transfer” to do just the same thing for
quite some time.This content downloaded from 139.22
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In an effort to clarify their politics, anthropologists often strip
transactions back to an untheorized, vernacular usage of the
word “transfer”—noun: “1. An act of moving something or
someone to another place, organization, team, etc.” (OED 2018).
A transfer stratagem therefore exists nascently in a good deal
of the anthropological literature. In economic anthropology the
vernacular language of transfer is consistently used to describe
the moment of movement in a transaction under conditions
where the nature of the transaction described is yet to be es-
tablished by argument. For instance, in Toward an Anthropo-
logical Theory of Value, David Graeber (2001) uses “transfer” or
“transferring” when he wishes to highlight the ambiguity of
either the motivation behind the movement of a valuable or its
economic status, hence: “a potlatch turned on a contrast be-
tween two sorts of transfer: the host received a unique title . . . at
the same time defining the guests as faceless and generic in
comparison” (210); “we have encountered extremely compli-
cated systems of transfer in which the exact dimensions of
‘groups’ are rarely entirely clear” (226); “the subsequent transfer
of names occurs not only within one’s own moiety but within
one’s matriclan” (143). Graeber even adopts a definition of gifts
that hinges on the emptiness of the term “transfer”: “To give a
gift is to transfer something without any immediate return, or
guarantee that there will ever be one” (Graeber 2001:225, citing
Godbout and Caillé 1998). Gregory (1982:67, 137, 164) and
Parry (1986:457–464) both use “transfer” in much the same
way, as does Yan (1996:57, 88, 182, 186–187, 200–202).
Carrier (1990) characterizes Mauss as claiming that a gift ac-
quires meaning insofar as it is “the transfer of something iden-
tified with the giver” (24). This becomes increasingly prob-
lematic under capitalism, Carrier shows, because people rarely
make what they give or acquire it through gifting, and therefore
the gift becomes a special kind of transaction. In other words,
in the construction “the transfer of something identified with
the giver,” the word “transfer” does the work of opening us to
the possibility that there might be other kinds of transaction
that would still result in the same transfer of that thing to that
other person. This is a most useful property of the emptiness
of the vernacular word “transfer,” which implies movement
without intimating cause or consequence; it is a word that can
cover changing between an airplane and a bus en route to your
destination and describe professional athletes switching em-
ployers. By contrast, Laidlaw’s (2000) discussion of alms for
Shvetambar Jain renouncers as among the closest real-world
parallel to “pure gifts” contains no such reference to transfers,
perhaps because the argument is that pure gifts create no friends
and therefore no space for such ambiguities.
It is precisely the politics of ambiguity thatMarilyn Strathern
(2012) depicts at play in the donation of human bodily material
and its use for scientific or medicinal purposes in the United
Kingdom. Given the sheer technical specialism required to ap-
propriately remove and artificially sustain, implant, or other-
wise utilize each kind of bodily material, the term transfer seems2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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not a coincidence that “organ transfer” is a technical term.
More than this, Strathern argues that the absence of a system
of monetary purchase to grease the wheels of bodily material
transfers heightens the ambiguity surrounding them, thereby
intensifying the sense in which these movements are best seen
as “transfers.” “It is as though a shadowy contract had been
created by the transfer, maintained as a debt the one owes or has
discharged to the other” (M. Strathern 2012:401). Tensions are
high because in most of the cases Strathern describes, the donor
of bodily material is dying or has died just minutes ago. The
situation is so riddled with ambiguity and yet so suffused with
high feeling that any use of a term that is not devoid of con-
ceptual content could not manage to describe it. The ambiguity
of the term “transfer” in “organ transfer” used throughout the
text enables the conflicts to coexist.
Nancy Munn’s (1986) work on value and exchange on Gawa
within the Kula Ring also uses transfers in the same content-
stripping way that Graeber, Strathern, Gregory, Parry, and Yan
do. In Munn’s terms human action consists of attempts to
control intersubjective space-time, extending it out with your
Maussian gifts to your partners and allies, such that the waves
created by your actions are reified into fame. Fame is the end-
point rather than exchange for the sake of exchange. The means
for achieving this goal is to engage creatively with extant types of
exchange, rather than simply replicating exchange forms. The
result is a transformation of intersubjective space-time. Graeber
conjectures that the reason Munn’s theory has been little taken
up is that it seems to evade any solid transactional form such
that wemight say that such-and-such amount of value has been
invested in such-and-such object (Graeber 2001:45–46). It is
perhaps the best example of theorizing economy through terms
that are themselves processual, which it does by developing a
language of its own before turning to ethnographic description.
I would hope that developing a usable language that can deal
with inconsistent transactional forms could facilitate more
ethnography of this kind.9 Linking transactions in terms of
transfers provides a process-oriented concept that enables de-
scription, a unit that can be put to work to describe the traffic
of temporality.
Conclusion
Any coherent analytical method that shifts our attention away
from a market versus gift exchange, economist versus an-
thropologist set of dichotomies, is a potentially valuable re-
source—especially so given the persistent feeling that con-
temporary anthropologists who highlight reciprocity are
merely arguing against economists who are in fact long dead,9. Among these anthropologists, “transfer” is used just as it is in the
English vernacular, to imply movement in possession without assuming
the nature of the connection. It would be likewise informative to look at
other languages’ “transfer” equivalents and to problematize the conceptual
biases of using the English language, even at this level of abstraction.
This content downloaded from 139.22
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critique. I have no desire to rehearse anthropology’s exchange-
centric denouncement of homo economicus again. Economics
and anthropology apparently once had a productive relation-
ship, but it was considered long gone back in 1962 (Burling
1962; see also Hart 1986). The problem of marrying economic
and anthropological perspectives on economy was put suc-
cinctly by Stephen Gudeman (2001:81), who proposed that
anthropologists and economists are caught in a dialectic, both
offering clearly distinct but equally essentialist views. Anthro-
pologists overemphasize reciprocity, relationality, and altru-
ism, and economists do the same for atomism, markets, and
egoism (but see Schokkaert 2006). As Davis notes, charity
and altruism are as awkward tomarket economists as theft and
barter are to “reciprocalist economists” (read: anthropologists)
(Davis 1992:24). Their contrast is a product of the dyadic,
totalizing tendencies of the disciplines, which we would do
well to circumvent, and it so happens that I think transfers fills
the bill.
We anthropologists have been critiquing economists for
their emphasis on markets, but many moved on long ago to an
interest in transfers, and it is time anthropologists gave their
own theoretical clarity to the concept. Economic analysis is in
the business of testing the connections between transfers in a
causal manner. What anthropology can bring to the economic
analysis of transfers is a microanalysis of the politics involved in
correlating transfers, both on the ground and in a publicly en-
gaged discipline. Economics brings hard data onwhether and in
what ways the economic matter moved by transfers has em-
pirical effects on later transfers, whether or not they are con-
ceptually connected by those involved. A combination would
produce analyses that account for both the micro-politics of
transfer connection and also the blind spots, the cognitive disso-
nance, and the uncanny connections that are there but go unseen.
I have attempted to hold my gaze firmly on the transfers
themselves and compare them before characterizing the na-
ture of the obligations or desires generating them. This is not
to throw out or ignore the politics that lead to alienation in
the production and sale of commodities any more than it is to
forget that reciprocity is an ever-present possibility that can
take communistic as well as competitive forms. These points
are as important as they have ever been. The aim of my ar-
gument has been to get away from the idea of transactions as
the locus of vague conceptual unity, with its bird’s-eye view
and contractual agreement bias, and move toward a language
in which things as conceptually challenging as gambling and
gifts can be schematized without contradiction using the scale
of movement which unites them.
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In an area of inquiry characterized by ever-thicker underbrush,
Anthony J. Pickles’s “Transfers” is a welcome effort to clear the
ground. It encourages us to ask ourselves just what it is that we
are seeing when we look at gift exchange, market transactions,
donations to charity, and the like. Pickles reminds us that much
of what has interested economic anthropologists amounts to com-
pounds of a single building block, the transfer of something from
one person or entity to another. As his paper argues, gambling,
gift exchange, endowments, and so on all can be approached as
different structures that people make from that block.
This argument has a number of benefits. The one that Pickles
stresses is that it encourages us to consider the ways that the
people we study, as well as we who do the studying, put those
blocks together to produce something identifiable as a trans-
action in the stock market, a marriage exchange, or a purchase
of groceries in a supermarket. As Pickles notes, these constructs
are social accomplishments, and like all such things they require
social effort and are problematic.
In pointing to the social nature of these things, Pickles
encourages us to attend to the social factors that make some
forms of behavior and ways of labeling them more likely than
others. The most obvious of these is people’s socialization into a
set of understandings of different sorts of situations and of the
transfers that are part of them. People of my background learn
what to expect when we buy our groceries, how to behave,
and how to think about the transfer of money to the check-out
clerk and the transfer of groceries to ourselves. And as Michael
Taussig’s (1977) description of Cauca Valley peasants shows,
there is nothing natural or automatic about this.
That observation raises a further question. Are there broader
factors that induce people in different societies to be socialized
into some ways of viewing transfers rather than others? Taus-
sig’s description suggests that there are. Eric Schwimmer (1973:This content downloaded from 139.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a49) suggests something similar, when he says of Westerners
and of the Orokaiva people of Papua New Guinea:
Westerners depend on institutions other than gift exchange
for the acquisition of desired scarce resources. Hence the in-
stitution of exchanging Christmas presents need serve no
other end but the fostering of social exchange relations. For
the Melanesians . . . gift exchange must serve economic as
well as social ends.
TheseMelanesians were in a society in which subsistence came
largely through transfers of a certain sort, were socialized ac-
cordingly, and so were prone to think about things that we would
call gifts in a way very different from how, Schwimmer suggests,
most of those who read these words would think about the
transfers that we call Christmas presents (see also Parry 1986).
My point here is a simple one. The idea of transfers en-
courages us to attend to how the people whom we study think
about them, why they think that way, and what the conse-
quences might be.
It also encourages us to attend to howwe as researchers think
about the transfers that we observe and why we think about
themaswe do.Here I think that there are twoways that Pickles’s
view is more optimistic than might be justified.
The first of these is what appears to be his assumption that
focusing on transfers will reduce the chance that our descrip-
tions and analyses will be hobbled by our tendency to put
transfers into handy intellectual categories, like commodity
payment, gambling debt, and gift. It might, but it is the case that
if we are to make manageable the variety of things that we
observe in the world, we are likely to need categories of some
sort. This is especially the case if we want to communicate with
each other, for that requires that we put what we know into
common terms that reflect common concepts. It is hard to see
how the notion of transfers gets us out of this problem.
The second reason that I think Pickles might be too opti-
mistic is his observation of another way that the world is more
complex than our categories: gift societies are not so purely
based on gifts as we had thought, just as commodity societies
are not so purely based on commodities. As Pickles observes,
this produces terminological and conceptualmuddle, illustrated
by the use of “so-called” as a prefix to qualify the invocation
of a type to label a sort of transfers: “in Melanesia in particular
‘gift exchange’ became ‘so-called gift exchange’.”
Themuddle is real, but I think its roots lie in areas other than
those illuminated by attention to transfers. The key area is the
common disciplinary tendency to approach units as a whole,
whether the Melanesian societies of my time in the field or
the financial sector of those concerned with, for instance, the
housing crisis in southern and eastern Europe. When this is
coupled with an alternative, perhaps encroaching commodity
systems in Melanesia or precarious homeowners in parts of
Europe, there is a tendency to simplify each element of the
pair and to stress their differences from each other. The result
may be the construction of something like opposed ideal types,
and as Max Weber (e.g., 1949 [1904]:91–93) observed, these2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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However, they are not empirical descriptions. So when the ideal
type of the gift system confronts the reality in the field, it is
inevitable that the reality is, at best, a so-called gift system.
I said that Pickles’s article can help to clear the underbrush
that is thick in work on circulation in economic anthropology.
My purpose here has been only to suggest that it will not do the
clearing by itself. We need to do a lot of the work ourselves.Robert C. Hunt
Professor of Anthropology (Emeritus), Brandeis University,
Waltham, Massachusetts 02453, USA (hunt@brandeis.edu). 25 II 19
Pickles is productively continuing the work of Pryor and Hunt
in paying close attention to one-way economic transfers. In the
first part of this CA commentary I address conceptual issues. In
the second part I will suggest some avenues for further empirical
work that seem to have promise.Concepts
Pickles supports the position that exchange has been very
prominent in economic anthropology. But some of us have
argued that addressing one-way transfers is also important.
I propose that all economic exchanges include at least two
transfers. But it does not follow that all transfers imply ex-
changes, the point that Pryor and Hunt were making. Cen-
tral to this argument is a clear understanding of “economic.”
That understanding does not now exist. If one accepts Hunt’s
crude definition of economic, then the generalization about
exchanges and transfers holds. Empirical work on one-way
transfers has been slight.
Pickles states the following: “a subcategory of one-way
transfers looks positively dysmorphic, lumping together what
would otherwise be considered radically different transac-
tions. . . . When theft and charity are in one subcategory
that is then opposed as a whole to gift exchange, then the sit-
uation is clearly obstructive.” Pickles has misunderstood here.
The opposition Hunt proposes is between one-way transfers
and exchanges.
Pickles refers to Hunt’s retreat. I do have a position. All
exchanges are built of transfers (among other features), but not
all transfers are connected to (economic) exchanges. IF one
objective is to describe and understand an economy, then the
exchanges are very important. But so also are the one-way
transfers. Pryor and Hunt insisted on how important it is, and
I have not retreated from that insight.
There are three obvious conceptual problems that have not
been solved. I have mentioned the definition of “economic”
above. This links to another conceptual problem. In American
English we find it easy to say that a person who cares for and
shows attention to another is exchanging those behavioral atti-
tudes for a potential inheritance. In other words, some examplesThis content downloaded from 139.22
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that are not economic occur. These might be understood as
an exchange. The nature of that other stuff (reputation, love,
loyalty, etc.) is not well understood. I am trying to limit the
discourse to what is clearly economic and leave the other fea-
tures aside for the moment. The success of this strategy depends
on a clear operational definition of the concept of economic.
Another conceptual problem is that of identifying, in a given
situation, which transfers are linked to other transfers to form
exchanges. Some are easy to identify. A market exchange be-
tween two strangers that is simultaneous is probably a clear-
cut case. But there are delayed transfers that are part of ex-
changes, and identifying the transactions as exchanges seems
to be possible only if the participants agree that an exchange
exists. Thus the burden for empirical case studies is knowing the
opinions of the participants (assuming all participants agree).
Pickles mentions slavery. This is a case where scientific lan-
guage is necessary (see Hunt 2007a) for a discussion of the
difference between folk or natural language, and scientific lan-
guage. Pickles seems to be taking his example primarily from
the US cotton plantations in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. He asserts that being a slave is a one-way transfer. It
can easily be understood differently. There have been many
slim accounts of labor organization that are called slavery,
and they display a great deal of variation. Slave and slavery in
this case are folk terms. Some cases of slavery may be one-
way transfers. Treating a captive of war or a slave raid as a one-
way transfer appears to be appropriate. But in a number of
“slavery” systems the would-be slave is an agent, and becom-
ing a slave is the result of one or more exchanges. Further,
ending the slave status can be accomplished by another ex-
change between “owner” and “slave,” and the agency may lie
with the slave. The condition of slavery varies enormously
with the cultural system and with the behavior of the slave. We
need a set of good case studies that cover the details and in-
clude a number of different cultural systems.
Case Studies
Our attempts to understand economic exchanges have a long
history, and for good reason. They are prominent, and they are
important. We have many empirical case studies (including
important ones by James Carrier). We have very few good case
studies of one-way transfers. The scale and importance of the
assets in one-way transfers is not well described. Pickles cites
some relevant and important data on the situation in the United
States, United Kingdom, and France for recent years. Pickles
is at work on gambling. Detailed case studies are very impor-
tant for progress in our understanding. They not only provide
fine-grained data but they also permit, and even encourage,
conceptual progress when combined with systematic compar-
ison of case studies.
Some other cases of one-way economic transfers can be sug-
gested. There was much discussion of the civil-religious hier-
archy in Mesoamerican Indian villages in the second half of2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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Pickles Transfers 23the twentieth century. In those cases adult members of the
society were given the opportunity to perform public admin-
istrative service. It usually started with lowly positions. After
a few years of rest, a higher stage in the hierarchy would be
offered and accepted. Continual success in this career would
result in serving at the top of the hierarchy. Office holders
were not compensated economically for their service. Often
the economic expenses of the office holder were considerable.
These performances were central to the continuing survival of
the economic political, ritual, and cultural systems of the Indian
towns. They seem to be systems of one-way economic transfers.
Communal irrigation systems (varying in size fromdozens of
hectares to hundreds of thousands of hectares) typically have
a set of administrators and a set of water guards. In many cases
those who occupy the offices are not compensated economi-
cally. Those who are good at their job (honest, calm experts are
running an irrigation system, good at peacefully resolving
conflicts) may stay in office for decades (see Hunt 1988, 2007b;
Hunt et al. 2005).
There seem to be a number of cases of one-way economic
transfers in administrative realms. The administration of small
islands off the coast ofMaine (Murray 2010), leadership of some
academic departments, and the peer review of research grant
proposals and papers for scientific journals would seem to be
cases worthy of further study.
Pickles hasmoved us forward. There ismuchwork to be done.Marcos Lanna
Associate Professor, Departamento de Ciências Sociais and
Programa de Pós Graduação em Antropologia, Universidade Federal
de São Carlos, Brazil (barolo96@gmail.com). 23 I 19
A. J. Pickles’s “Transfers: A Deductive Approach to Gifts,
Gambles, and Economy at Large” is a thought-provoking paper
that brings new questions to a classic issue. One of these is
that the ethnographer in the field often asks what is the “default
of the ‘exchange’ unit of analysis”; in other words, not every-
where can one find an institutionalized exchange system such
as Kula or potlatch. In my case, I found nonexchange in the
sense that patrons in Northeast Brazil were not giving to their
clients; rather, there were secret intrapatronal exchanges. I also
identify with Pickles raising doubts about generalizing “ex-
change” as a concept and trying to rethink it in relation to other
more general concepts, such as transactions. Last but not least,
there is an emphasis on unilateral “transfers,” a notion Pickles
shows to have been important for many authors and which
he builds into a concept. He does not suggest a simple substi-
tution of “exchange” for “transfer” but rather differentiates uni-
lateral “transfers” from what he calls the “Maussian gift,”which
he correctly describes as reciprocal.
The essay on the gift has been interpreted in different ways.
Some have formulated new theories inspired by it, and others
follow Mauss more closely, considering what he said in 1924 toThis content downloaded from 139.22
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without necessarily using him to prepare a new theory. Neither
of these was Pickles’s aim. By focusing on transfers, his aim is to
complement Mauss. Gifts, as transfer, become “transactional
subcategories.”Using transfer as a new concept would “facilitate
more ethnographically led and reflective analyses.”
The paper also tackles gambling as a form of transfer, given
its importance in Melanesia. Transfers are understood “as a
manifestation of efforts to decouple economic transfers from
reciprocal obligation.” It is not clear how deep is Pickles’s in-
terest in the noneconomic (or, using Mauss’s word, “total”)
aspect of both transfers and gambling, and if either participates
in creation processes of an autonomous economic sphere (in
Polanyi’s sense). My quibble is: Why would either avoid reci-
procity? Could not gambling produce images, or some form of
mental accountability related to other, noneconomic reciprocal
obligations? What would it mean to win a gamble? Is not a
gambling system very much derived from an accumulation of
bets that afterward is redistributed?
Pickles ask relevant questions such as, “What is unique to
gambling that we all seem to recognize it when we see it? Where
does it sit in relation to other kinds of transaction, and how
variable might that position be? Why, exactly, is it close to fi-
nancial speculation, and why is it far from a Christmas present?”
His answers presuppose substantive comparison, whereas it
seems to me that Mauss’s heritage, as developed by Claude Lévi-
Strauss, especially in Mythologiques (without ever abandoning
the study of the gift—Lévi-Strauss [2000]), means that we have
to compare structures, or languages (such as cooking—Lévi-
Strauss [1968]), defined by relations between form and content
(or the transformation between form and content and vice
versa—Lévi-Strauss [2001]).
For Pickles, “by stakingmoney (i.e., by committing it to being
part of a consolidated transfer) gamblers attempt to gain valu-
ables that have been divorced from reciprocal obligation, and
so cause a one-way transfer in their own direction,” whereas I
would argue that money is staked by the gambler and then
centralized by a banker, who redistributes it afterward.We have
a reciprocal transaction, even if it is unilateral, when money is
stakedwith the expectation of gain. A banker is not too different
from a Trobriand or Kwakiutl chief, even if he only redistributes
to a few winners. Mauss, Malinowski, and Polanyi saw the ac-
cumulation of yams byTorbrianders chiefs as tributes. Likewise,
bettingmoney is centralized, there is necessarily always a return,
and, more important, there is an expectation of return by all
those who bet. Tributary systems can be progressive or regres-
sive, and similarly, gift systems can objectively contemplate all
or some, but subjectively always contemplate all. Mauss taught
us that what is more important is not the economic aspect but
the relation between this and other aspects, such as the sub-
jective ones. Amember of a given housemight be satisfied never
getting a return gift, as long as his house did. I do not consider
gambling to be “far from a Christmas present.” If the winner is
not obliged to make a return to the losers, the reciprocal aspect
of gambling is not found in this. If Pickles is right that there2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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in order to legitimize gambling and that we have to concen-
trate on “most players’ perspective of gambling,” the industry
is one player in the system, and if one accepts its similarity in
form and content to chiefs elsewhere, the most important one.
Our task is to follow all the circulation involved.
Gambling can also be characterized as a structure that is a
function of an event, a lottery, a raffle, rather than the other way
around. As Pickles puts it, “In gambling the stake is tied to the
unforeseeable result of an event that, when resolved, strictly de-
termines an outcome. Gambling therefore has among its defin-
ing characteristics the negation of a mutual assumption among
players that one should be obliged to reciprocate the flow of
valuables that occurs during the course of a game.” But recip-
rocation is an obligation of the banker, and there are rules in
each form of gambling about how it should be done. I do not
agree that the “language of transfers opens up the conceptual
possibilities of gambling,” or at least I would like to suggest that a
more radical opening was achieved by Lévi-Strauss’s (1962)
contrast between rite and game, a theory of rite further devel-
oped later (Lévi-Strauss 1971), expanding on the 1962 reflection
on contingency and “événement.” It is important to note Lévi-
Strauss’s (2000) later insistence that he had remained faithful
to the study of “Maussian gifts.” The latter are not necessarily
“ultimately satisfying when resolved” but can create as many
expectations and as much anxiety and tension as gambling.Thomas M. Malaby
Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee,
PO Box 413, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201, USA (malaby@uwm
.edu). 26 II 19
There is a distinct Weberian spirit to Pickles’s suggestion that
anthropology take up transfers as a considered analytical term,
one more flexible in its application than the familiar “transac-
tion.” The spirit is welcome, even if the challenging aspect of
such an enterprise seems always to be in how the offering of
a relatively neutral conceptual tool seems always to run the risk
of charges of “misplaced concreteness.” But throughout, Pickles
stresses the pragmatic epistemological position from which he
speaks and the heuristic, process-oriented quality of “transfer”
as offered, doing so here quite plainly: “Transfers are not a re-
ality to be found; they are a concept to be used.” From here, it
is compelling to hear how this concept allows us to use “transac-
tions” more particularly, to indicate the practical and ideological
attempts to make sense of transfers under one or another of
what Sally FalkMoore (1978) called “processes of regulation”—
the “establishment and maintenance” to which Pickles refers.
Along the way Pickles raises the possibility that anthropol-
ogists and economists may have fallen into diametrically op-
posed root assumptions about economic action, perhaps all
the more opposed given the existence of the counterview (a
kind of schismogenesis, although one must think that the an-
thropologists have been more concerned to define themselvesThis content downloaded from 139.22
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claim on the need to critically examine our categories, but the
challenge to do so must apply even to Pickles’s recommenda-
tion, and upon consideration the concept of transfer as pre-
sented may contain at least a spark of atomism in its very con-
struction, one that echoes in certain respects Parry’s discussion
of the issue. Pickles at one point moves to set aside Mauss’s
question of the “spirit of the gift,” but many of these dimensions
of the issue reappear in the latter section on transfer as used in
anthropology. I would suggest that, while the concept is clearly
a move forward for our language about economic action, yet
the term must always imply distinct agents, and thereby at least
begin to smuggle in the beginnings of unencumbered selves,
potentially eliding some of the very historical and institutional
context that Pickles would like to have in a better position to in-
clude. As always, however, the proof is in the pudding of specific
analyses; it is not about finding a different term that avoids these
problems entirely but, rather, how in specific applications we
will or will not manage to guard against such distortions.
As a case in point, the issue does become more noticeable in
Pickles’s discussion of gambling. The gains, to be sure, are clear;
Pickles is convincing that the term will help us remain mind-
ful of the contingent, open-ended nature of economic action,
driving home the point, so important to Bourdieu (1977) and
Falk Moore, that we too often tend to collapse time and ignore
indeterminacy in our analyses. We also want room, however,
to pull the frame back, as Natasha Dow Schüll does (2012), to
consider not only the ex post facto (ideological) accounting of
economic action but also how the platforms on which social
action takes place, including their game-like forms, are them-
selves objects of (also fraught, also contingent) institutional proj-
ects as well as bound up in the shaping of subjectivities. There
is, in a way, a larger field of play, one where a focus on transfers
could become an impediment to insight. Another way to put
this is to zoom in farther, rather than to pull out, and to rec-
ognize that in gambling, as in any social action, the experience
as an end in itself bears scrutiny, one that may be foreclosed by
a readiness to frame the action as a transfer, amove that prompts
us to think at a certain level of analytical magnification.
But the conceptually perfect is the enemy of the heuristically
good. We have in Pickles’s argument good grounds for recog-
nizing the murkiness of analyses that do not sufficiently dis-
tinguish the contingent movement of economic value, on one
hand, from its construction according to a given interpretive
scheme, on the other. A process-oriented anthropology must
tread a fine line, but it is encouraging to see conceptual head-
way made nonetheless.Susana Narotzky
Universitat de Barcelona, Montealegre 6, 08022 Barcelona, Spain
(narotzky@ub.edu). 11 III 19
In this piece, Pickles proposes the concept of transfer as a the-
oretical resource for analyzing transactions. Transactions, in2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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Pickles Transfers 25turn, are defined as “reifications” that emerge as a result of the
political work of delimiting and sustaining transactional catego-
ries, that is, the “form” of the transaction that is socially mean-
ingful. Transfers appear as a “theoretical motive . . . force,” as
a component unit of every transaction, and therefore in all
transactions there is an “exchange of transfers.”A distinction is
posited between the transfer as abstract motivational unit and
the concrete transaction defined as “every imaginable instance
duringwhich congealed human activity is considered tomove.”
The attempt to clearly define the component elements and
processes involved in transactions is commendable and po-
tentially useful to think with. Still, in its present form, it seems
to me to obscure, rather than enlighten, the field of economic
anthropology that studies the allocation, circulation, and ap-
propriation of items defined as valuable and its correlation
with the making of socially meaningful relations.
The article rests on the formalizations that occurred in an-
thropology around the gift and reciprocity as an obligation to
return, as the entanglement of material and symbolic exchange,
and around chains of obligation making the social fabric; yet
it is a bold attempt to develop a meta-analysis of exchange the-
ory. The initial idea is to focus on “one-way transfers” instead of
on exchange (bi- or multilateral transfers) that frees analysis
from the aprioristic framework of a transaction, in which the
processes for achieving commensurability and reaching equiv-
alences are the focus. Instead, the author suggests that by using
the concept of transfer—which he has extracted from empiri-
cally defined one-way transfers—what anthropologists will be
able to provide is the political processes that produce distinct
categories of transferable “objects,” together with the “intan-
gibles” attached to the transfers and the “form” of the trans-
action, that is, the socially recognized practice. Following from
this, the program he sets for us is the “microanalysis of the
politics involved in correlating transfers,” the work that goes
into “connecting and disconnecting all those endless transfers,”
looking into successful as well as failed exchanges. “Linking
transactions in terms of transfers provides a process-oriented
concept that enables description, a unit that can be put to work
to describe the traffic of temporality.”
The article is intriguing in three ways. First, Pickles seems to
point at a politics of valuation, that is, the processes by which
categories are constituted and evaluated in relational terms,
as one of the central contributions of the transfer concept to
exchange theory; but it is unclear tome how “politics”mediates
between the abstract unit and the concrete carving out of
meaningful transferable objects and transactional forms. What
does the authormean by “politics,” and howdoes it operate, not
empirically in concrete cases but as a constitutive element in
his proposed theory of transfers? Many authors have recently
addressed the issues around valuation registers and techniques
(Fourcade 2016; Lamont 2012) and the tensions, negotiations,
conflicts, avoidances, and omissions attached to juggling dif-
ferent value regimes (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Guyer 2004),
or struggling about the systems of valuation (Collins 2017; De
Angelis 2007). It would be useful for the author to engage withThis content downloaded from 139.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms athese debates if he wants to make a contribution that seriously
addresses the political.
Second, temporality is rightly highlighted as crucial to un-
derstanding the chains of transfers that have been the focus
of anthropologists’ attention for a long time. Annette Weiner
(1980) pointed out early on the entanglements of valuables,
relationships, and re-valuations that made social reproduction
possible in Trobriand. Likewise, John Comaroff (1980) ana-
lyzed marriage payments among the Tshidi of South Africa
as an ambiguous, time-bound, and flexible process of wealth
transfers that could always be reconfigured and reinterpreted
as something else in the future, resignifying relationships con-
cerning multiple generations (alive, dead, and yet to be born).
Anthropologists and historians studying exchange (and dis-
possession) in colonial and other unequal encounters have ex-
posed how transfers, in contexts of value pluralism, can be
negotiated halfway between comparability and incommensura-
bility, a process that nevertheless enables transactions to occur
at a point in time, although these might be challenged in the
future (Curtin 1992; Wolf 1982). What does the transfer con-
cept add to these analyses of complex, power-laden, chains of
transfers that provide punctuated space-time locations for trans-
actions that will often be refigured or disavowed in the future?
The formalization of transfer as a “movement of economic
matter with a single directionality”—the “mitochondrial trans-
fers”—seems to detract from complex analyses of circulation,
meaning entanglements, valuation struggles, and fields of power
that anthropologists and others have proposed. Paradoxically,
it achieves the opposite of what it sets out to do, which is to
highlight the forces that make circulation possible in cognitive,
ideological, social, political, and material terms. Instead, the
transfer mitochondrial unit appears to efface them.
Finally, Pickles shows how the use of the term “transfer” in
empirical contexts and in scholar debate serves to signify the
movement of something that has been defined as transferable
whether material or immaterial. This common usage refers to
a multitude of practices in different social, cultural, and his-
torical contexts. “Upgrading” the term to a conceptual category
within a theory that remains a transactional one may divest
it from its heuristic value, unless the processes by which the
carving out of categories for objects, relations, and transactional
connections is conceptually clear.Reply
I am really grateful tomy eminent colleagues for their sustained
engagement with my work and to the editors at Current An-
thropology for enabling this unique forum. To summarize my
reading of their readings: Transfers was a welcome attempt to
deduce a simpler, “heuristically good” (Malaby) metalanguage
for transactions in anthropology, even if doubts remain about
transfers’ critical potential (Narotzky, Carrier) or universal2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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that I was quite surprised there was not more pushback on the
potential for collaboration with economists through transfers,
but perhaps that proposition is best answered by economists
themselves. I will respond briefly to a few specifics before ad-
dressing the more substantive reservations as a coherent body.
First, Hunt is quite correct to emphasize that alleged ex-
amples of “one-way transfers” require a critical appraisal of just
how “one-way” they are in practice, and I appreciate the in-
clusion of some specific examples in what has become a pretty
technical discussion, as well as the nuance Hunt adds to how
slavery practices should be characterized. Similarly, Lanna rightly
points out, on the one hand, my oversimplification of Maus-
sian gifts at one point as “ultimately satisfying when resolved.”
I should rather have said that they “imply there ought to be
a return.”On the other hand, I see little to gain in comparingmy
effort to open up conceptual space with Transfers against Lévi-
Strauss’s contrast between game and rite (1996:30–33). Many
will recall Lévi-Strauss’s neat claim that games use structure to
create inequalities between competitors where they had not ex-
isted before (i.e., winners and losers), while ritual creates a unity
of participants from an original asymmetry between the sacred
and the profane. For what it is worth, I think Lévi-Strauss’s
inversion is a bit too neat; it begins with a competition-centric
characterization of games, and so probably produces an overly
unity-centric characterization of ritual (I prefer Suits’s [1978]
definition of games, but there is no space to explain why). Lévi-
Strauss’s contrast is undoubtedly more intellectually produc-
tive than my article, as Lanna observes; I just think it neither
contradicts my own contribution nor particularly speaks to it.
The UK gambler would say there are horses for courses.
I see the rest of the critiques and reflections as more or less
connected, so I will try answering them dialogically, working
my way outward from the particular to the general, starting
with Lanna and ending up at Carrier.
Lanna questions whether gambling is in fact a one-way
transfer, because during play a reciprocal relationship exists
with the pot/banker so long as all the gamblers/banker com-
mit to returning the stake and paying out to the winner. Lanna
correctly identifies an automatic and involuntary reciprocity
because all players must abide by the result of the gambling
event for a gamble to have occurred instead of a swindle. This
is the magic of gambling, by enforcing categorical obligation
within the event it always creates a novel imbalance shorn of
obligation outside it. So while it may be objectively true that
gambling produces imbalanced transfers through a unilateral
return, subjectively the result always appears as a “one-way
transfer”; that is, the reciprocity is effaced as just “part of the
game,” transforming into a single movement of wealth and
so “free money.” I think gambling illustrates the utility of a
transfers approach precisely because of the dissonance between
objective attributes and subjective experience.
That said, I too have experienced the many ways that gam-
bling mimics the form of other, more “traditional” forms of
redistribution and absorbs much of the language of reciprocity.This content downloaded from 139.22
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I contrast North American Pawnee and one Highland Papua
New Guinea style of gambling. In the latter, collective bets pro-
duce opposing wholes that subsume individual contributions,
mirroring bridewealth payments where wealth is considered
female, productive, and collective; among Pawnee in the 1890s,
war allies bet different forms of wealth as if they were equiva-
lent in face-to-face encounters, the items bound together before
being communalized and staked on a single outcome, the result
being that wealth appeared like a scalp taken in war: a trophy
of individual male prowess within a collective male endeavor
(see Lesser 1933). My point is that such reciprocal obligations
and the ensuing micro-transfers are contained and even en-
abled within what must always be a one-way transfer at the
close of the gambling event, allowing gambling to take a huge
variety of forms that explore different perceptions of wealth
and its properties.
This brings me to Hunt’s acute observation that under a
“transfers” framework the “burden of knowledge” falls on the
anthropologist to know the opinion of each party in a trans-
action so as to learn how the transfers are configured. This may
be ethnographically challenging, but focusing on this aspect
and especially the confluence or dissonance between official
and participants’ perspectives has continually enabled economic
anthropologists to offer novel contributions to the analysis of
circulation (as Narotzky reminds us in her comments), and
I would hope to prompt more of it. Hunt’s concern centers on
a hidden pitfall: How to know which transfers are considered
“economic” among different parties to a transaction? Every
crisis an opportunity. I see little value in finding my own “clear
operational definition of the concept of economic” in order
to get to work collecting comparable ethnographic material.
Transfers is an attempt to fashion better conceptual conditions
with which to learn how ethnographic subjects come to an
often less than wholly “clear operational definition of the con-
cept of economic,” as well as understanding the inverse: on
what basis are some of the anthropologist-identified transfers
of potentially useful energy (care, attention, companionship)
decoupled from the “economic” in subjective experience? Then
again, when the person/people/peoples under consideration do
not operate on the basis of a distinction between the economic
and the noneconomic (see Carrier’s comments), then we can
describe that situation more easily using transfers if we are
likewise unburdened by any need of a “clear operational defi-
nition of the concept of economic.” This answer is unlikely to
satisfy Hunt, but I think this a desirable attribute of a process-
oriented terminology.
Narotzky similarly argues that upgrading transfers into a
conceptual category may divest it of its heuristic value in com-
mon usage unless the other conceptual components configur-
ing transfers are defined more precisely. Where Hunt points to
the “economic,” Narotzky asks what is meant by politics “as
a constitutive element in [my] proposed theory of transfers?”
Apparently, without a clear definition then the effort must fail,
but I think we can muddle on just fine without it. More so than2.123.226 on May 11, 2020 03:31:39 AM
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of abstraction upon which transfer “politics” can be the subject
of an intellectually productive generalization; I doubt it, but
I will certainly give it some thought. At this early stage I want
to avoid over-determining the nature of politics because it is
the “politics” that becomes the ethnographic object under a
transfer-centered framework. Letme be clear, the term “politics”
is not intended as a substitute for culture, structure, ontology, or
suchlike, because I do not wish to assume a shared framework
of valuation or a shared understanding of the nature of the
parties—or even that there must exist parties before, during,
or after the transaction. I use politics to describe social life in
motion, in conflict, and always up for grabs. I think by centering
our analysis on the politics as it relates to the way transactions
are fashioned from transfers, then we can more easily compare
our efforts. If I put further parameters on the “politics” at this
point, then I would be presupposing both the nature of the
“dependent variable” and in the same moment presupposing to
some extent the nature of the party or parties. If after a thorough
exploration of cross-cultural examples of the “politics” consti-
tuting certain mutually recognized transactional types I came
to a theory about the nature of the politics necessary for those
transactions to bemutually recognized as a type, then that would
be another matter. But that really is something for another,
brighter day.
Having responded unsatisfactorily to the charge of concep-
tual under-theorization, I turn now to the potential for trans-
fers to over-determine the ethnographic object. Be prepared
for more disappointment. Narotzky goes on to highlight four
signature ethnographic works as “analyses of complex, power-
laden, chains of transfers that provide punctuated space-time
locations for transactions that will often be refigured or dis-
avowed in the future.”Narotzky argues that a focus on transfers
appears to efface their complexity. The reason it might do so
is not clear to me. I only see them all effectively summarized
within the terms I laid out, and demonstrating the utility of
a light-touch framework as a tool to partially draw out what
is comparable.
Malaby delivers a homologous evaluation in a more con-
crete manner: the term transfer risks definitionally implying
the existence of distinct agents and thus a bias toward con-
sidering people as “unencumbered selves.”Malaby and Lanna
both point to the same evidence: the experiential enjoyment
of the act of gambling and its consequences for perception are
downplayed by a concentration on the constituent transfers,
and given this aspect of gambling is also a major site of in-
terested action and even exploitation, then something has been
lost. Given the Melanesianist obsession with the implications
of relational selves, I feel particularly conditioned to share a
concern that unencumbered selves might be smuggled into the
debate through recourse to transfers. Then again, I am confi-
dent that my response is ethnographically determined because
it is precisely the micro-transfers, relations, and reciprocities
in-game that Papua New Guineans appear to enjoy so much.
They were having the most fun figuring out relations throughThis content downloaded from 139.22
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downplayed and the game may even appear as a void to dis-
appear into (Schüll 2012). In essence I agree that reducing
gambling entirely down to its component transfers would mis-
characterize the gambling experience as self-contained and
cover up its exploitation, but as Malaby and Lanna also note,
I am advocating transfers not really as an exclusive approach
to transactions but as a complement to Maussian and other
approaches and an opportunity to mix ethnographic logics in
the cement and see what stands up. I share the anthropologists’
resistance to any kind of conceptual determination, but wemust
also address exchange-determinism and the determinism that
comes with unreflective common usage of English language
terms. Somewhat ironically, I would advocate exchanging “ex-
change” with transfers at certain points as part of a holistic
approach not because we need more conceptual determinism
but because we need less, and a greater awareness of how en-
shrining certain conceptual models may hobble us. Transfers
makes room for more, together, and allows comparison by
operating as a minimally meaningful connecting concept.
Finally, I thank all the commentators for their generosity,
Malaby in particular for his commendation, and both Carrier
and Hunt for their calls to action so that we might proceed
to clear more of the underbrush that surrounds our concepts
of circulation. I fully agree with Carrier that anthropologists’
tendency to create opposed units (us/them, gift/commodity,
etc.) can be a useful Weberian technique, but more often it
leads to a double bind wherein we either actively reinforce
those oppositions or endlessly critique them. These units are
still largely ordained by our methods: discover “gift econo-
mies” as aWeberian ideal type 1 conduct fieldwork 1 critique.
It is surely over-optimistic, but transfers learned as a heuristic
tool might yet offer some budding anthropologists more an-
alytic flexibility. It helped me in Papua New Guinea. Instead of
leaning on the concept of exchange, in Money Games (2019)
transfers helped me compare various kinds of card gambling,
bridewealth payments, futures trading, Moka ceremonial ex-
change, street sales, sharing, produce marketing, savings orga-
nizations, gifts of money, slot machines, and the Kula network.
These became rolling transformations of an aesthetic approach
to transfers. I came to transfers from a desire to overcome the
easy oppositions that plague Melanesianist anthropology in
particular, but I think transfers could be useful to others as well.
So, yes, I suppose the proof is going to be in the pudding.
—Anthony J. PicklesReferences Cited
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